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defendant's trial strategy. 23 An accomplice who was being tried
first had a strong chance of acquittal, and Mr. Barker did not
object to the delay of his own trial while the accomplice was
tried. 24 The Supreme Court noted in its opinion that the lack of a
motion to dismiss on the grounds of violation of a speedy trial
because of incompetent counsel can be a situation warranting
dismissal on appeal. 25
The failure to raise an issue, which would result in dismissal of
the charges, is thus ineffective assistance of counsel in the federal
courts as well as in New York State courts, and is violative of
both constitutions. However, if the failure to raise the issue is
part of a defendant's trial strategy, there is no valid claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in either state or federal court.
SUPREME COURT
RICHMOND COUNTY

People v. Costello 26
(printed September 15, 1994)
The defendants filed a motion to set aside their convictions27
pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law section
330.30(1)28 on the ground that they were denied the effective
23. Barker, 407 U.S. at 534-36.

24. Id. at 535.
25. Id. at 536.
26. N.Y. L.J., Sept. 15, 1994, at 33-35 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County

1993).
27. The defendants were charged with five counts, in total, of which they
were convicted of three: (1) criminal trespass in the third degree under N.Y.

PENAL LAw § 140.10; (2) operating solid waste management without a permit
under N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-0707(1); and (3) disposing of solid
waste at a non-permitted facility under N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6,
§ 360.15.
28. N.Y. Clm. PROC. LAW § 330.30(1) (McKinney 1993). This section
provides in pertinent part:
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assistance of counsel during trial in violation of both the State 29
and Federal 30 Constitutions. 3 1 The court denied the motion and
32
let the convictions stand.
Defendants discharged their counsel upon their conviction, at a

bench trial on the counts of trespass in the third degree, operating
solid waste management without a permit, and disposal of solid
waste at a non-permitted facility. The new counsel alleged five
main points of incompetence of the previous counsel. 33 It was
asserted that prior counsel was responsible for: (1) ignorance of
criminal law and procedure; (2) failure to object to highly
prejudicial evidence of an unproven crime and failure to object to
inadmissible hearsay evidence; (3) presenting arguments which
were "basically incomprehensible;" (4) ineffective crossexamination and the failure by counsel to pursue material

inconsistencies in testimony of adverse witnesses; (5) serious
error in the failure to raise an objection to the reduction of
charges against the defendants which resulted in a non-jury trial,
At any time after rendition of a verdict of guilty and before sentence,
the court may, upon motion of the defendant, set aside or modify the
verdict or any part thereof upon the following grounds:
1. Any ground appearing in the record which, if raised upon an appeal
from a prospective judgment or conviction, would require a
reversal or modification of the judgment as a matter of law by an
appellate court.
Id.
29. N.Y. CoNST. art. I, § 6. This provision provides in pertinent part: "In
any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear
and defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions ...."Id.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This provision provides in pertinent part: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to... have the
assistance of counsel for his defence." Id. See Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85,
90 (1955) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel
includes the effective assistance of counsel).
31. Costello, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 15, 1994, at 33.
32. Id. at 34. Under § 330.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law, the
defendants sought to set aside their conviction for criminal trespass in the third
degree based on lack of evidence and the fact that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the environmental claims. Id. at 34-35. The court
refused to modify or set aside any of the convictions. Id. at 34.
33. Id. at 33.
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and the lack of an objection to request recusal of the trial judge
based on a personal relationship with a witness for the
prosecution. 34
The court addressed the Sixth Amendment ineffective
assistance of counsel claim in accordance with the federal
standard set forth in the consummate federal case, Strickland v.
Washington.3.5 The court expressed surprise that defendants' new
counsel did not cite the case in their argument. 36
In Strickland, the Supreme Court set a two-prong test to
determine whether errors on the part of counsel reached the level
of a constitutional violation. 37 The first prong requires deficient
performance on the part of counsel, with the burden on the
defendant to show that the representation failed to attain a level
of reasonably effective assistance. 3 8 Counsel's performance must
have had serious errors which would cause the court to conclude
that counsel's representation was not the functional equivalent of
representation as guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment. 3 9
The second prong is the so-called prejudice requirement,
wherein the defendant is required to demonstrate a "reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome." 40 The Court in Strickland stressed that, if either
prong was not satisfied, defendants claim would fail. 4 1 Under the
federal standard, the court in the instant case found neither prong
of Strickland satisfied. 42 Previous counsel had two of the five
charges acquitted and performed in a manner that was not
deficient. 43 The court remarked that because this case was a
34. Id.
35. 466 U.S: 668 (1984).
36.
37.
38.
39.

Costello, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 15, 1994, at 34.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Id.
Id.

40. Id. at 694.
41. Id. at 696.
42. Costello, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 15, 1994, at 34.
43. Id.
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bench trial, there was no issue concerning the influence of errors

upon a jury. 44 Where the trier of fact is a judge, it is presumed a
judge will not decide the case based on counsel's performance at

trial, but will only consider legally admissible evidence at trial. 45
The court then examined the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim under the New York State Constitution. 4 6 It stated that the
New York rule has the same basic purpose as the federal rule, to
foster the adversarial system of justice to best achieve the result

that justice is served fairly, 4 7 and the requirement that the

defendant have an advocate competent to secure "fairness in the
adversary criminal process." 4 8
There is a split in the New York courts concerning the standard
for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Baldi4 9

acknowledged

this

split5 0

and

utilized

the

meaningful

representation standard to judge whether counsel provided the
defendant with assistance/representation
satisfying the
5
1
constitutional requirement.

44.Id.
45. People v. Harris, 133 A.D.2d at 649, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 758 (2d Dep't
1987).
46. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
47. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). The Supreme Court
commented that the rationale of the adversary system is "'that partisan
advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that
the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free.'" Id. at 655 (quoting Herring
v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)).
48. Costello, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 15, 1994, at 34 (quoting United States v.
Morrison, 499 U.S. 361, 363 (1963)).
49. 54 N.Y.2d 137, 429 N.E.2d 400, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1981).
50. Id. at 146, 429 N.E.2d at 404, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 897 (stating that either
of two different standards are appropriate to evaluate effectiveness of counsel;
one standard is whether the trial was rendered a "farce and mockery of
justice," and the other standard followed the federal view of "reasonable
competence" (citing People v. Aiken, 45 N.Y.2d 394, 380 N.E.2d 272, 408
N.Y.S.2d 444 (1978))). See People v. Brown, 7 N.Y.2d 359, 361, 165 N.E.2d
557, 558, 197 N.Y.S.2d 705, 707 (1960) (explaining the "farce and mockery
of justice" view).
51. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d at 146, 429 N.E. 2d at 404, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
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In New York, the view of what constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel is very similar to Strickland, although the
New York Court of Appeals has not expressly adopted
Strickland.52 Baldi is the controlling case in New York for
ineffective assistance of counsel. In Baldi, the attorney
vigorously pursued an insanity defense for a defendant who was
charged with murder, attempted murder, burglary, and weapons
possession. 53 On appeal, it was asserted that the attorney
blundered by not pursuing a defense of innocence. 5 4 The New
York Court of Appeals held that trial tactics which result in an
unsuccessful defense do not automatically indicate ineffective
assistance of counsel. 55 The law, evidence, and circumstances of
the case, viewed in totality at the time of the representation, must
be weighed to determine whether counsel provided "meaningful
representation."56 It was also stressed that, because of the
uniqueness surrounding each trial, there could not be an all
encompassing fixed list of criteria to prove ineffective assistance
of counsel. 57
The Costello court cited People v. Flores58 to stress the point
that after the fact differences of opinion about tactics and the
scope of examination of witnesses does not meet the required
threshold to violate Sixth Amendment guarantees. 59 The court
then mentioned several cases where the errors have been grave
60
enough to impair the meaningful representation requirement.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 147, 429 N.E.2d at 405, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
55. Id. at 146-47, 429 N.E.2d at 405, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
56. Id. (emphasis added)
57. See People v. Droz, 39 N.Y.2d 457, 462, 348 N.E.2d 880, 882, 384
N.Y.S.2d 404, 407 (1976) (stating the difficulty in defining "inadequate" or
"ineffective" legal representation or to formulate "standards which will apply
to all cases" (quoting People v. Bennett, 29 N.Y.2d 462, 466, 280 N.E.2d
637, 639, 329 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (1972))).
58. 84 N.Y.2d 184, 639 N.E.2d 19, 615 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1994).
59. Id. at 187, 639 N.E.2d at 20, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 663.
60. See People v. Wandel, 75 N.Y.2d 951, 554 N.E.2d 1274, 555
N.Y.S.2d 686 (1990) (conflict of interest of defense counsel by the
representation of prosecution's chief witness and defendant was considered
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The case at bar is analogous to Flores because prior counsel was
able to obtain acquittals against forty percent of the charges
brought against the defendants, a fact that is hardly indicative of
61
ineffective counsel.
In addition, as it was a bench trial, there was no impact on the
jurors' perception of incompetence that might affect a verdict. 62
In a bench trial, the judge is only allowed to consider evidence
that is legally 'admissible and must exclude any inadmissible
evidence in reaching a decision. 63 The court also mentioned that
the trial judge offered to recuse himself because although he
lacked personal knowledge of one of the witnesses, he knew that
the witness played basketball on his son's team. 64 The trial
attorney felt this was not a sufficient ground to raise an objection

ineffective assistance of counsel); see also People v. Ortiz, 76 N.Y.2d 652,
564 N.E.2d 630, 563 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1990) (counsel put a former client on
stand and elicited false testimony); People v. Rivera, 71 N.Y.2d 705, 525
N.E.2d 698, 530 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1988) (failure to make motion to suppress);
People v. McDonald, 68 N.Y.2d 1, 496 N.E.2d 844, 505 N.Y.S.2d 824
(1986) (counsel defended the accused and represented the victim); People v.
Mattison, 67 N.Y.2d 462, 494 N.E.2d 1374, 503 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1986)
(partner in same law firm represented a codefendant who plea bargained and
served as witness against the other codefendant); People v. Peterson, 97
A.D.2d 967, 468 N.Y.S.2d 955 (4th Dep't 1983) (failure of counsel to raise
motion for Wade hearing on photo identification, and ineffective closing
remarks); People v. Angellilo, 91 A.D.2d 666, 457 N.Y.S.2d 118 (2d Dep't
1982) (counsel did not make opening statement, call witnesses, or prepare
defense). All of the preceding cases had aggregations of serious errors which,
viewed in totality, deprived the defendants of effective assistance of counsel.
61. See People v. Ellis, 81 N.Y.2d 854, 613 N.E.2d 529, 597 N.Y.S.2d
623 (1993) (stating that acquittal on three out of four charges brought against
the defendant which used as its defense a strategy to make the defendant guilty
of the least severe charge does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel).
62. Costello, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 15, 1994, at 34.

63. See People v. Harris, 133 A.D.2d 649, 650, 519 N.Y.S.2d 758, 759
(2d Dep't 1987) (stating that trial judge presumed to have considered only
admissible evidence introduced at trial, and must exclude inadmissible
evidence from reaching a verdict).
64. Costello, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 15, 1994, at 34.
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and agreed to have the judge hear the case. The decision was
reasonable under the circumstances. 65
Thus, while the New York rule has not adopted the two prong
Strickland standard, the "meaningful representation" requirement
is a very similar standard, in both application and effect, to judge
66
effective assistance of counsel.

65. Id.
66. Id.
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